Proposal For An Exhibition

The term proposition has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses and the meanings of declarative sentences. Propositions are the sharable objects of attitudes and the primary bearers of truth and falsity. This stipulation rules out certain candidates for propositions, including thought- and utterance-tokens which are not sharable, and concrete events or facts, which cannot be false.

Aristotelian logic identifies a proposition as a sentence which affirms or denies a predicate of a subject. An Aristotelian proposition may take the form “All men are mortal” or “Socrates is a man.” In the first example the subject is “All men” and the predicate “are mortal.” In the second example the subject is “Socrates” and the predicate is “is a man.”

Bertrand Russell held that propositions were structured entities with objects and properties as constituents. Wittgenstein held that a proposition is the set of possible worlds/states of affairs in which it is true. One important difference between these views is that on the Russellian account, two propositions that are true in all the same states of affairs can still be differentiated. For instance, the proposition that two plus two equals four is distinct on a Russellian account from three plus three equals six. If propositions are sets of possible worlds, however, then all mathematical truths (and all other necessary truths) are the same set (the set of all possible worlds).

The ongoing series of works which are all exhibited under the title “Proposal For An Exhibition” are sets of installations which themselves could be seen as exhibitions. The green screen is the proposal’s container, citing popular media culture.